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Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi
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Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi : Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950ndash;1990 (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950ndash;1990 (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy):

11 of 13 people found the following review helpful. Interesting Work By Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh I had a love/hate relationship with this book. First, and this is purely a stylistic point, I believe it could have been far better edited. It was an avalanche of statistics, statistical analyses, and presented results without a lot of discussion of why relationships emerged. Their first goal -- showing development does not "cause" democratization is, I believe, a revamp of earlier published work. It is, nonetheless, an important finding that is worth repeating. More interesting is the relationship between dictatorships and demography, but, again, aside from a little theorizing and a few statistical tests I believe the authors do little to shed much light on why different regimes affect demography differently. They begin to flesh out an argument the crux of which revolves around the ability of democratic polities to "commit" to providing social welfare over the long run, but this seems to run counter to their initial dismissal earlier in the book of the Neo-Institutional economics claim put forth by Douglass North, among others, as to the importance of institutions in "binding the hands of the sovereign." Finally, their results do show that democracies tend to survive in wealthy states, in essence becoming "unkillable" after a certain level of wealth is reached. They do little to really explain why this is, but the result gives credence to Lipset's thesis that development, at the very least, helps sustain democracies. Overall I liked the book and would recommend it as an assigned book in a comparative politics/political economy class.

0 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Five Stars By Daniel F Torres Great 2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Sophisticated and brilliant By Manoel Galdino It's a marvellous book. I took a course last year with Limongi about the book and it was great. The main feature I like in the book is the sophisticated discussion about selection bias in comparative politics and how to avoid it. In fact the methodological discussions in it are fundamental to all scholars researching in comparative politics. However, I think that some improvement could be made to the book in some statistical techniques used, and also in the reproducibility of the research. Nowadays I would love to have access to the code used to run regressions (although I suspect they did it in SPSS), just to name one improvement possible on reproducibility. Besides, I think they should explicitly have treated some time correlation problem in their data. Despite that, it is a great book and fundamental in any research in comparative politics.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.